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Abstract
During the first 2 years of the COVID-19 pandemic, the disruptions across society were
both intense and varying along pre-existing structural and social lines of inequity,
especially in the US. Research has shown that this pattern was particularly true in the
context of K-12 education. To assess when, why, and how school districts and charter
management organizations (CMOs) chose to adopt and execute new policies for the
delivery of education during the pandemic, I review existing theories of organizational
inertia and analyze four general characteristics of school districts/CMOs for their ability
to predict districts’ likelihood of implementing new instructional delivery methods. My
findings suggest that both larger and younger school districts were more likely to adapt
in response to the pandemic’s disruption of education.

External Shocks to Education During COVID
As COVID-19 spread across the US beginning in the spring of 2020, schools and
districts in the US often had little stability to rely on as they rapidly transitioned to remote
learning, often without sufficient access to technology: “As the [pandemic] crisis began,
millions of children, particularly those in low-income communities, lacked access to the
computers and connectivity that would make in-person remote learning possible,
creating even greater equity gaps than those that already existed” (Darling-Hammond,
2021). Declining enrollments also meant that once-consistent funding was now much
less secure, although an influx of federal funds from the CARES Act provided some
balance to these funding shortages. Nonetheless, districts’ concerns about future shifts
in the pandemic’s intensity and declining tax revenues meant that CARES money was
only a temporary solution to a complex problem (Belsha, 2020). This added to the
uncertainty faced by district leaders in making decisions about spending and operations.
Additionally, a May 2022 report from the Center for Education Policy Research found
that “remote instruction was a primary driver of widening achievement gaps”
(Goldhaber, et al., 2022: 5). This helps explain why the shift to remote learning (and
especially its varying and extended duration) qualifies as an environmental shock to
organized education systems, at least based on student outcomes. The authors of this
report point to significant and stratified degrees of learning loss over the study’s 2-year
span, finding that, “On average, students who attended in-person school for nearly all of
2020-21 lost about 20 percent worth of a typical school year’s math learning during the
study’s two-year window….But students who stayed home for most of 2020-21 fared
much worse. On average, they lost the equivalent of about 50 percent of a typical
school year’s math learning during the study’s two-year window” (Leonhardt, 2022). The
report also showed that poorer students were more likely to shift to remote modalities,
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and stay there longer. Taken together, these findings support the conclusion that the
shift to remote learning had regressive effects, widening pre-existing gaps in
educational access and outcomes.
Additionally, statistical research analysis by nature tends to be conservative in its
methods, in order to avoid making claims with false confidence. As such, the reality of
such divisions in student outcomes may even be more intense than the data has
indicated: “The evidence to date likely understates both the average academic impacts
of the pandemic and the opportunity and achievement gaps it has produced”
(Dusseault, 2021: 4). I anticipate that observed gaps in learning loss may continue to
grow as more time passes, enabling researchers to look at longer trends with larger
amounts of nuanced data.
This CEPR report also references another study in its introduction: “Jack et al. (2021)
documented declines in proficiency rates in districts that shifted to remote instruction,
especially in districts serving larger shares of Black and Hispanic students and lower
income students” (Goldhaber, et al., 2022: 6). While this may be a real, observed trend
in certain contexts, the CEPR authors highlight this study’s inability to separate
proficiency rates by school and the fact that only 12 states were included in their
analysis. As such, it seems that only a rough association can be assumed rather than
explicit causality.
In addition, social and emotional development was severely harmed by the extended
absence of students to socialize, learn, and grow alongside their peers with consistent
frequency. A report from the Brookings Institution states that “academic learning losses
in reading and math are a growing concern across the U.S. and globally, especially for
children living in low-resourced communities that have been disproportionally affected
by the abrupt shift to remote schooling. However, many are equally concerned about the
harder-to-predict developmental effects of ongoing social deprivation, both in and out of
school, for children'' (Bassok, et al., 2021). This demonstrates how the effects of COVID
were multifaceted and unevenly distributed across society.
This multifaceted nature of schooling disruptions caused by the pandemic reinforces the
idea that constitutes a significant environmental change in the organizations that
comprise education systems. But while the lack of stability created many challenges,
many educators and researchers saw the moment as one of opportunity. For instance,
researchers at the Center for Reinventing Public Education argued in a september 2021
report that, despite complex challenges it caused, COVID-19 offered a chance to
radically imagine what a “new normal” could and should look like for education systems
(Dusseault, 2021: 13). This point was echoed by an insightful op-ed in the Washington
Post, titled “The Kind of Teaching Students Need Right Now” that calls for, among other
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new practices, an emphasis on social emotional learning, especially after 15 months of
COVID and its traumatic effects on families across all levels of society. In the article,
Valerie Strauss cites the ideas of educator Larry Ferlazzo, who argues that education
delivery that recognizes the traumatic experiences which many students have gone
through will be crucial (Strauss). At the same time, it is still important for teachers to set
boundaries with students, even though the experiences of the pandemic have been
difficult for everyone. One teacher in Texas notes that “students may mistake
compassionate teachers as quasi-therapists. Crossing this boundary can be harmful for
both students and educators” (Bartholomay, 2021: 65). The long-term impacts of
COVID, especially on mental health, has made almost every facet of professional life
more difficult, especially in the classroom. Pretending that everything is “back to normal”
once students are sitting in classrooms instead of sitting on a zooming call during the
school day is reductive and ignores the reality of the past 2.5+ years of life in the US
and abroad.
Additionally, research highlighted in report from the Learning Policy Institute has
demonstrated that “personalizing” learning by putting students in front of programmed
computers for machine-based instruction for long hours at a time — or piles of
worksheets that offer the same decontextualized approach to learning” can lead to
worse academic outcomes. Education cannot simply zoom the problem away; remote
learning has to be part of a comprehensive restructuring of education delivery. What’s
more, a narrow focus on learning loss will only lead educators “...down a familiar road,
one paved with repetitive remediation, disengaged students, and reluctant families who
are disillusioned with impersonal, inauthentic learning” (Darling-Hammond). The
disparities in achievement outcomes exacerbated by the pandemic need to be dealt
with using creative and evidence-based solutions.
If necessity is the mother of innovation, then the significant external shock that this
pandemic had on K-12 education systems provides a fitting opportunity for educators to
radically reimagine systems at the structural, policymaking, and classroom levels. In the
a report from the International Commission on the Futures of Education, a structure
within UNESCO, lead author Sahle-Work Zewde ends the report’s introduction by
asserting that “COVID-19 has the potential to radically reshape our world, but we must
not passively sit back and observe what plays out. Now is the time for public
deliberation and democratic accountability. Now is the time for intelligent collective
action” (International, 2020: 4). Educators can and should think about how to continue
delivering quality instruction remotely, how to safely and effectively transition back to
in-person or hybrid learning schedules, and what new instructional practices deserve to
stick around once COVID-19 becomes an endemic, accepted part of life and ceases to
upend education with the frequency and intensity that it did over the first year and a half
after its onset. At the same time, it is important for educators and especially
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administrators to understand that fatigue is a significant human factor that can limit
effective implementation of reforms. Teachers are often tasked with using many new
techniques in teaching in rapid succession, often at the same time (Eckert, 2017). This
means that there is such a thing as too much innovation, but adaptability during the
tumultuous period of the pandemic is still incredibly important.

Organizational Barriers to School Reform
For this project, I chose to focus on indicators of instructional flexibility and core
changes in the delivery of education, including student grouping practices and teachers’
responsibilities in leading them. Changes in such features, based on the challenges of
COVID, would seem to indicate that flexibility on the part of districts is at least
correlated, time-wise, with an environmental change in the form of a pandemic.
Educators should understand why and how it is that school reforms of all types have all
too often failed to produce any meaningful change. The education scholar Richard
Elmore (1996) argues that “Much of what passes for “change” in U.S. schooling is not
really about changing the core, as defined above. Innovations often embody vague
intentions of changing the core through modifications that are weakly related, or not
related at all, to the core” (Elmore, 1996: 3). His beliefs about what counts as the core
features in educational practice include “...how teachers understand the nature of
knowledge and the student’s role in learning, and how these ideas about knowledge
and learning are manifested in teaching and classwork. The “core” also “includes
structural arrangements of schools, such as the physical layout of classrooms, student
grouping practices, teachers’ responsibilities for groups of students, and relations
among teachers in their work with students, as well as processes for assessing student
learning and communicating it to students, teachers, parents, administrators, and other
interested parties'' (Elmore, 1996: 2). These concepts strongly influence my variable
selection to identify what core features of education were changing, which I explain later
in more detail.
Elmore also explains that “The problem of scale in educational innovation can he briefly
stated as follows: Innovations that require large changes in the core of educational
practices seldom penetrate more than a small fraction of U.S. schools and classrooms,
and seldom last for very long when they do” (Elmore, 1996: 1-2). This is a sobering
thought, given the heightened state of turmoil and uncertainty that education systems
have been experiencing since the onset of the pandemic.
The education scholar Charles Payne (2008) has analyzed the political, economic, and
social dynamics of school reforms. He assesses institutional inertia in the context of
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K-12 education systems, finding that a lack of both social capital/support and material
resources can be extremely detrimental in the process of implementing reforms.
Specifically, in procuring the majority of educational reforms since the late 1980s and up
through No Child Left Behind’s passage in 2002, educators and policymakers across
the political spectrum have focused excessively on finding the magic bullet of school
reform, instead of understanding the stifling environments and embedded structural
barriers at work in the most under-resourced schools. Payne provides illuminating
perspective by saying “when even good ideas are understood out of context, when they
are reduced to The Solution, they become part of the problem” (2008: 5). Often, policies
that are labeled or promoted as core change do little to nothing to undo fundamental
problems. Context is key to understanding the variety of problems which hinder schools
that try to adapt.
In his book 110 Livingston Street, David Rogers highlights several key features of the
New York City Board of Education and school system, which, in addition to
dysfunctional politics at the inter-organizational level, stand in the way of progress.
Among them are overcentralization and an “upward orientation of anxious
subordinates”; vertical and horizontal fragmentation, which leads to poor coordination
between units within systems; informal pressure between personnel which can work
against wider goals; insulation from clients due to internal politics and individual career
goals; and committee structures which splinter authority (quoted by Payne, 2008: 123).
Unfortunately, this frequently results in “a situation in which people can administer
failure constantly and, again, not feel like failures, protected both by the complexity of
the organizational structure and by ideologies of ‘professionalism’” (Payne, 2008: 124).
Ironically, some of these features are the result of standardization and bottom-line
accountability taken too far.
____________________________________________________________________

Building a conceptual framework using theories of organizational
inertia and change
Why do organizations across a range of sectors and types seldom make significant
operational changes, even in the face of significant outside pressure? The concept of
routinization and inertia in organizational environments has long been a subject of focus
for social research. In an essay published in 1968, Max Weber argued that
“bureaucracy…was so efficient and powerful a means of controlling men and women
that, once established, the momentum of bureaucratization was irreversible” (Weber,
quoted in DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 147). With all due respect to Weber, this seems like
an overly deterministic view of structured organizations’ unwillingness to change.
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Organizations today are highly structured entities, but changes can still occur. Whether
such changes are permanent, significant, and legitimate depends on the context of the
different times, places, and the environments in which changes are to be implemented.
Nonetheless, research has shown how greater stability is highly valued in organizational
contexts, which often leads to less capacity to adapt in the face of new challenges.
According to Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) work, while “...institutionalization and
standardization offer the advantage of reproducibility, they generate strong pressures
against change because organization members seek to maintain the status quo that
protects their interest. Thus, the very characteristics that give an organization stability
also generate resistance to change” (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991: 593). From a rational
self-interested perspective, it makes sense that organizations, particularly larger ones
with more employees and anxious shareholders, would want to minimize uncertainty in
the foreseeable future and maximize predictability. Other researchers have contended
that “highly structured organizational fields provide a context in which individual efforts
to deal rationally with uncertainty and constraint often lead, in the aggregate, to
homogeneity in structure, culture, and output” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 147). Across a
range of organizational types, passionate and driven individuals often find themselves
blocked from making meaningful progress due to rigid and stubborn structural
environments. Destler (2014) describes the persistent gaps between formal policy and
informal practice: “Prior research on organizational change (e.g., Sandfort, 1999)
highlights the difficulty of changing deeply ingrained practices. Even if individuals within
an organization support a reform or perceive a need for change, inertial forces can
impede substantive change” (Destler, 2014, quoting Hannan & Freeman, 1984, on p.
204). School districts often experience this problem for a variety of different reasons, but
often the schools and districts with greatest need for reform have the least human
capacity and material resources to effectively do so (Payne, 2008).
In thinking about what factors lead organizations to break with such powerful forces of
inertia of core practices, my understanding of institutional inertia is rooted in Hannan
and Freeman’s (1984) theory of structural inertia. In their research, core organizational
features are defined as the following:
1) Stated Goals, the “basis on which resources are mobilized”
2) Forms of Authority within an organization
3) Core technology, especially investments in infrastructure and human
capital/capacities
4) Marketing strategy, the kinds of clients/customers “to which the organization
orients its production and the ways in which it attracts resources from the
environment”
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Changes in any of these fundamental aspects of an organization therefore represent
some meaningful degree of core change.
In their research on organizational inertia, Kelly & Amburgey (1991) argue that older
organizations are less likely to change because, once organizations become more
established, they are more likely to become set in their ways: “...old organizations have
had time to formalize relationships and standardize routines (Stinchcombe, 1965),
structural stability increases monotonically with age. The other side of this increasing
stability is increasing resistance to change: inertia also increases monotonically age
(Hannan & Freeman, 1984:157)” (Kelly & Amburgey, 1991: 594). This pattern is
significant across a variety of organizational types in the private and public sector.
Other scholars have confirmed this pattern of the greater age of organizations creating
rigidity: “Organizations may change their goals or develop new practices, and new
organizations enter the field. But, in the long run, organizational actors making rational
decisions construct around themselves an environment that constrains their ability to
change further in later years” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: 148). Over time, organizational
inertia builds up and decreases the potential of any core changes in operation.
This argument will help illustrate why the distinction I make between older public school
districts and newer charter management organizations in my analysis of schools’
likelihood of changing core practices is sensible and meaningful. If CMOs (which are
newer organizational forms that only came into practice starting in the 1990s) are vastly
more equipped, for whatever reason, to adopt and implement changes compared to
public school systems, it would be unwise to pretend as though these two forms have
no meaningful differences when it comes to flexibility and implementing new practices.
This leads to my first hypothesis:
H1: Since school districts are older than CMOs, school districts are less likely to initiate
changes in their core practices.
Other foundational research has highlighted the importance of organizational size and
inertia: “Size is also associated with resistance to change (Hannan & Freeman, 1984:
158). As organizations increase in size, they emphasize predictability, formalized roles,
and control systems (Downs, 1967: 158). Organizational behavior becomes predictable,
rigid, and inflexible” (Kelly & Amburgey, 594). This understanding of size as a known
factor in determining a lack of flexibility leads to my second hypothesis:
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H2: Larger districts will exhibit greater inertia, and are thus less likely to initiate changes
in their core practices.
Existing research contains mixed findings on the potential for external shocks that
significantly change the environment in which an organization operates to motivate
change in core organizational features. For instance, Singh, Tucker, and Meinhard’s
(1988) study of almost 400 Toronto-area voluntary organizations, from 1970 to 1982,
found that an environmental shock, defined as distinguishing two distinct legislative
periods, “was associated with an increase in the probability of core feature change”
(Kelly & Amburgey, p 595). On the other hand, Baum’s (1990) study of over 750
Toronto-area daycare centers over a span of 18 years found that “…environmental
change, as measured by increases in the cost of capital to small businesses, was
associated with a decrease in the probability of core feature change” (Kelly &
Amburgey, 595). While school districts are certainly different kinds of organizations, this
pattern still provides helpful context. Because of these mixed results, I decided to test a
similar theory in a different and more current context, which leads to my third
hypothesis:
H3: A district/CMO’s likelihood of initiating changes in core practices is positively
associated with a longer period of time spent in exclusively remote learning modalities,
which is due to the significant environmental shock to education posed by the pandemic
While learning loss has been given enough, perhaps even too much, focus in the
research on the pandemic’s effect on students, I also include a fourth hypothesis to test
the following:
H4: A district/CMOs likelihood of initiating changes in core practices is positively
associated with a greater level of learning loss

Process of Inquiry
This paper analyzes data from the American Educator Panel surveys conducted by the
RAND corporation in 2020 and 2021. There are three nationally-representative groups
of educators that RAND conducts periodic surveys on: the American Teacher Panel, the
American School Leader Panel, and the American School District Panel (RAND, 2020).
I focus on the ASDP surveys, making districts and charter management organizations
the unit of analysis. There were 4 rounds of surveys sent to superintendents and
leaders of charter management organizations during the first 2 years of the pandemic:
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wave 1 was conducted in October 2020, wave 2 in April 2021, wave 3 in June 2021,
and wave 4 in October 2021. I primarily draw from responses to the first and second
waves of this survey to test my theories of instructional change in response to COVID.
At first, I wanted to focus exclusively on lost learning as a possible driver of
implementing new practices at the district level. Learning loss has been a subject of
focus in educational research for some time, but some see the present connotation of
the concept as somewhat reductive and stifling: “While many of us resist the deficit
orientation of learning loss language, these concerns are certainly legitimate…It is
critically important that we address these concerns based not on outdated notions about
remediation, but on what we now know about how people learn effectively” (Brookings).
There has been a massive decrease in the amount of opportunities for learning during
the first 1.5 years of COVID, but returning to the same old techniques of remediation,
the authors argue, will improve nothing.
District policy and strategy is a meaningful case with which to examine theories of
change in structured organizations. There’s clear evidence of an external shock to
education based on student outcomes, based on findings from the CEPR report that
students lost between 20-50% of a year’s worth of math learning between fall 2019 and
fall 2021, and that “schools with large numbers of poor students were more likely to go
remote” (Leonhardt, 2022). This, combined with the lack of adequate technology for
remote learning experienced by students in poor families, created a double-challenge
for poor families in trying to minimize learning loss.
To identify what areas of education leaders were most concerned about at the start of
the first pandemic school year, I started by looking at the distributions of responses to all
7 questions in the first wave of ASDP. The distribution of responses indicated several
common concerns of district leaders, such as lost learning and social/emotional
development, staffing and funding shortages, access to technology, and the mental
health of students and teachers. I wanted to know if all these heightened challenges
might lead to more flexibility on the part of educators, to come up with creative solutions
to the unique problems caused by the pandemic.
Eventually, with guidance, I started thinking about how other features of districts/CMOs
might influence the likelihood of enacting and implementing core changes that have a
direct impact on students’ learning experiences, which lead to the formulation of my
aforementioned hypotheses.
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Data and Methods
For context, there is clear evidence that district and CMO leaders were concerned about
the immediate and long-term challenges to education posed by COVID at the beginning
of the 2020-2021 school year. By fall 2020, more than 3 out of every 4 districts were
already planning to retain a covid-driven change in their jurisdiction’s policies/practices
(RAND, 2020). Additionally, over half (53%) of respondents on the first wave of surveys
sent to district leaders indicated that “addressing disparities in students’ opportunities to
learn that result from differences in supplemental supports provided by families” was a
“significant concern” for their districts. This suggested that, even during the first few
months of school shutdowns necessitated by the public health impact COVID,
superintendents and CMO leaders were already concerned about students’ unequal
levels of access to and support for meaningful remote learning.
What’s more, over half (51.4%) of district leaders indicated that they were planning to
adopt “flexible staffing models in which teachers provide instruction to students other
than the ones who would be assigned to them if instruction were in-person (for instance,
helping other teachers with small-group instruction or teaching larger groups of students
than would be feasible in an in-person modality)”. Over half (50.8%) of district leaders
also said they were planning to adjust policies regarding instructional time. These
responses seem to indicate that a significant portion of districts were at least willing to
adopt significant changes in operational policy, which indicates a base level of
willingness to adopt core feature changes.
To measure organizational willingness and ability to adopt innovative instructional
practices as the dependent variable, I constructed a factor component variable using
district leaders’ responses to roughly a dozen questions that represent varying degrees
and types of operational flexibility. I used Hannan and Freeman’s (1984) ideas of core
organizational features to select questions that related, either explicitly or implicitly, to
changes in district policy that relate to the core of educational delivery. The following
table lists the selected questions I used to construct the factor analysis, which are also
described in the variable appendix:
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While these survey questions are neither perfect nor comprehensive indicators of core
changes in education, this combination of questions and answers provide strong
representations of core changes in the delivery of education. The Eigenvalue of the
strongest component analysis, which measures the consistency of responses to all of
these questions, is 2.429, which is high enough above 1.0 to assume a real-world
12

underlying rationale for why these answers hang together. I contend that this rationale is
the desire of district leaders to creatively imagine and enact new policies in response to
the challenges posed by COVID.
For my first hypothesis, the independent variable I use to indicate organizational age is
whether each district is a public school district or a private CMO, with the understanding
that CMOs are overall newer forms of school systems than public districts.
For my second hypothesis, the independent variable I use to indicate organizational
size is the number of students per district, broken up into 3 ordered categories: Tiny
districts are those with 0 to 700 students; small districts are those with 701 to 2250
students, and medium/large districts are those with 2251 or more students.
For my third hypothesis, the independent variable I use to indicate the degree of
disruption to schooling as an external shock caused by the pandemic is whether
students were learning in-person or remotely by winter 2021.
For my fourth hypothesis, the independent variable I use to indicate different amounts of
students’ learning loss are district leaders’ assessments of how far behind their students
were in math and reading skills in fall 2020 compared to fall 2019.
For my analysis, I start by creating bivariate regression models for each hypothesis,
using the factor component as the dependent variable each time. I also control for
demographic variation within districts in these models, due to the crucial context
provided by different student-body characteristics in an analysis of districts’ ability and
willingness to adopt new practices. The variable representing such differences is a
target/non-target classification of district, which is a dummy variable that indicates
whether a district has at least 50% of students who are black and/or latino or at least
50% of students qualifying for Free or Reduced-Price Lunch based on family income.
Finally, I create a multivariate regression model using all 4 independent variables, still
controlling for the target/non-target classification of districts.
In all of the variables I selected, I erased the non-response data, which were coded as
either -999 or -888 in the survey codebooks, for answers left blank and for legitimate
skips of the question based on previous answers given by each respondent. This was to
ensure that any results would not be skewed by these placeholder values, and instead
be solely based on answer options that respondents were usually asked to rank on a
scale of 1-4 or a similar range of options.
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Findings

Age,
indicated by
CMO/public
district
status (H1)

Tiny
district
size (H2)

Small
district
size (H2)

Large
district
size (H2)

Elementary
modality as
of winter
2021 (H3)

Secondary
modality
as of
winter
2021 (H3)

Adjusted
R2

0.036

-0.015

-0.015

-0.015

-0.008

-0.013

Slope

0.642

-0.362

0.119

0.155

-0.177

-0.153

p-value

0.043 **

0.397

0.741

0.502

0.507

0.564

Standard
deviation

0.313

0.425

0.358

0.230

0.266

0.263

Learning
loss in
math (H4)

Learning
loss in
reading (H4)

Multiple
Regression

Adjusted R2

-0.160

-0.160

-1.20

Slope

0.511

-1.273

p-value

0.661

0.463

Standard
deviation

1.127

1.658

The results of my regression analyses show that only district type (public or CMO) is a
statistically significant predictor of adopting innovative practices. All other hypotheses
fail to meet the threshold for statistical significance (alpha = 0.05).
However, I also created another regression model earlier in my process of analysis that
uses only 1 survey question as the dependent variable. This question, at the end of the
first wave of surveys, asked district leaders whether they had adopted any innovative
practices by fall 2020 in response to COVID that they planned to continue after the
14

pandemic. In a regression model controlling for demographic difference, ordinal district
size (1 for tiny, 2 for small, 3 for medium/large) is a significant predictor of this indicator
of innovation in educational delivery (p < 0.001), with a slope of 0.292 and standard
error of 0.055. In this model, the target/non-target variable has a p-value (0.884)
nowhere near the requisite 0.05 or below. Therefore, I suggest that district size may be
a meaningful predictor for the adoption of innovative practices in the context of
education.

Discussion/Conclusion
The fact that charter schools are positively associated with the likelihood of adopting
innovative practices supports my first hypothesis that younger organizations are better
equipped to change core features. Furthermore, the results of my regression model that
uses district size to predict the isolated indicator of adopting innovative practices refutes
my second hypothesis that larger districts will be less likely to change core features.
With a small but positive slope, it appears that larger districts are in fact more likely to
adopt innovative practices.
These findings can inform how current and future reforms in K-12 education can be
most successful in different environments. If public school districts and smaller school
districts are significantly less likely to adapt, there must be a keen awareness of the
policy features and resources needed to ensure effective implementation in these
educational contexts.
Limitations of this study include a relatively small sample size for all of my hypotheses.
Additionally, the measure of students’ learning loss for H4 was not based on student
assessment data, which would have been a stronger indicator than district leaders’
understanding of their students' outcomes. Finally, the fact that I only used the first two
waves of ASDP surveys limits the ability of these findings to describe broader changes
over time in the likelihood of districts to adapt.
Further research may find it worthwhile to test similar theories of district-level change,
especially in regards to duration of remote learning and degrees of learning loss, which
were both insignificant in my findings.
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Variable Appendix
Independent,
dependent, or
control) and
which
hypotheses it
corresponds
to

Wave Survey question
#
selected
(question#_row#
or other
externally coded
name)

Original phrasing of question (and
subquestion, if applicable)

Dependent
(H2)

1

“Q07: “Did your district adopt any
innovative practices in response to
COVID-19 that you anticipate continuing
in future years, even after the pandemic
has passed?”

07

Possible answers: 1 = yes; 0 = no
Independent
(H1)

n/a

District type

Independent
(H2)

4

wv4_district_size Possible options: 0-700 students,
701-2250 students, and 2251+ students
(I re-coded these options into a dummy
variable as 1, 2, and 3, respectively)

Control
(demographic)

1

Target/Non-Targ
et

At least 50% black or latino student
population, or at least 50% of students
qualifying for FRPL

Dependent
(H3)

2

d_att_schedule

Row 10: “cut some non-core courses to
focus on core academic courses (i.e.,
math, ELA, science, social studies)”

“Which of the
following
changes to the
school schedule
or calendar have

Possible options: Charter Management
organization or Public school district (I
created a dummy variable CMO = 1;
public = 0
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any one or more
of your schools
adopted for this
school year
(2020-2021)?”
Dependent
(H3)

2

d_ins_change
“Which of the
following
changes
to instructional
programming
have any one or
more of your
schools adopted
for the
2020-2021
school year?

Row 01: “Adopted new
online-accessible curriculum or
instructional materials”
Row 03: “Adopted a new learning
management system” core #?
Row 04: “Added software, courses, or
coursework (whether online or
in-person) to review previously taught
content or catch students up to grade
level”
Row 05: “Added or increased social and
emotional learning programming or
minutes”
Row 08: “Grouped students by ability
level”
Row 09: “Offered online course credit
recovery”
Row 10: “Offered one-on-one or small
group tutoring (whether virtual or
in-person)
Row 11: “Provided professional
development to teachers about how to
remediate learning required for students
to perform grade-level work”
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Row 12: “Reduced number of elective
courses to increase staff or resources
for core academic courses”
Row 13: “Changed grading policy to
assign students incompletes rather than
failing grades to avoid students having
to retake the entire course”
Dependent
(H3)

Dependent
(H3)

2

2

D_bud_services
“Which of the
following
changes to
partnerships and
services have
any one or more
of your schools
adopted for
2020-2021?”

(respondents were instructed to select
all rows/options that apply)

d_staff_change

Row 10: “Hired additional specialist to
offer push-in or pull-out instruction”

Row 03: “Partnered with one or more
online providers to provide virtual
instruction (e.g., tutoring or leading
full-size classrooms”
Row 04: “Partnered with before- or
after-school providers to provide
in-person homework or other academic
support”

“Which of the
following
changes to
school staffing
have any one or
more of your
schools adopted
for 2020-2021?”
Dependent
(H3)

2

d_stf_centoff_te
ach

“Has your district/CMO re-assigned
central office staff to classrooms to
cover teacher shortages in 2020-2021?”
0 = No, 1 = Yes

Independent
(H3)

2

d_ins_mode_ele
m

“Which of the following most closely
reflects how instruction is offered to the
majority of your elementary school-age
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students as of the date you are taking
this survey?” (emphasis in original)
1 = Fully remote instruction, where a
large majority or all students are offered
at least one synchronous class 4-5 days
per week
2 = Fully remote instruction, where a
large majority or all students are offered
less than one synchronous class each
school day (i.e., instruction might be
distributed via paper workbooks or
asynchronous videos)
Independent
(H3)

2

d_ins_mode_sec “Which of the following most closely
reflects how instruction is offered to the
majority of your secondary school-age
students as of the date you are taking
this survey?” (emphasis in original)
See above cells for description of
answer options 1 and 2 that I focus on
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